The most important wage and hour case from the Supreme Court this year was not a wage and hour case at all. Rather, it was a Rule 23 class action involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The TCPA regulates text messages that are sent for marketing purposes. In Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___ (2016), which was handed down on January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court addressed the impact of Rule 68 Offers of Judgment on a class action.
The Context of the Gomez Case
To understand the 2016 Gomez case, it is necessary to briefly revisit the Supreme Court’s 20__ opinion in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, , 569 U.S. ____, (2013). In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Thomas, the Court assumed without deciding that an unaccepted offer of judgment that fully satisfies a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to render an individual’s claim moot. Based on that premise, the Court then went on to consider whether an FLSA collective action claim can move forward when the underlying individual claim has been rendered moot. The Court ruled that it could not.
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the litigants in the Genesis Heathcare case assumed for purposes of the appeal that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment mooted the plaintiff’s claim. The assumption, which the majority in Genesis Healthcare did not question, caused great frustration to Justice Kagan.
Justice Kagan’s entertaining dissenting opinion, which begins by announcing that the Court has resolved an “imaginary question” and encouraging the reader to “[fusion_builder_container hundred_percent=”yes” overflow=”visible”][fusion_builder_row][fusion_builder_column type=”1_1″ background_position=”left top” background_color=”” border_size=”” border_color=”” border_style=”solid” spacing=”yes” background_image=”” background_repeat=”no-repeat” padding=”” margin_top=”0px” margin_bottom=”0px” class=”” id=”” animation_type=”” animation_speed=”0.3″ animation_direction=”left” hide_on_mobile=”no” center_content=”no” min_height=”none”][f]eel free to relegate the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind” since “[t]he situation it addresses should never again arise.” Joined by three justices, Justice Kagan argues fundamental contract principles—that an offer without an acceptance is a legal nullity — in determining that Ms. Symczyk’s claim was not rendered moot, thus undermining the assumption on which the majority’s decision hangs. Indeed, Justice Kagan argues, an FLSA collective action can never be rendered moot by an offer of judgment. This is because acting as a representative for a class of similarly situated persons is a part of the plaintiff’s claim. This part of the claim is not settled by an offer of judgment on the plaintiff’s individual claim alone and thus survives an offer that does not address the collective action.
Therefore, the threshold question – whether an individual plaintiff’s claim can be mooted by an unaccepted Offer of Judgment – remained unanswered. This brings us the Gomez case.
The Facts and Procedural History of Gomez
In Gomez, the plaintiff sued over a United States Navy recruitment program that he alleged violated the TCPA. He filed a Rule 23 class action in the Central District of California. Prior to the deadline for filing a motion for class certification, the Defendant submitted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, apparently for the full value of Gomez’s individual claim. The Plaintiff did not respond, and the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, “[n]o Article III case or controversy remained . . . because its offer mooted Gomez’s individual claim by providing him with complete relief.”
Prior to Gomez, there was a split among the circuit regarding whether an unaccepted Offer of Judgment for the plaintiff’s full relief mooted the claim. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had held that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment did not moot a plaintiff’s claim. Bais Yaakov v. Act, Inc, 798 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2015); Hooks v. Landmark Industries, Inc., 797 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2015); Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015); Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2015; Stein v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 772 F.3d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 2014); Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 954-55 (9th 2013). By contrast, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had held that an unaccepted Offer of Judgment did moot the plaintiff’s claims. Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2012); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2009); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Court Holds that Individual Claims Are Not Moot
In Gomez, the majority essentially adopted Justice Kagan’s dissent in Genesis Healthcare. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, which was joined my Kagan, Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Roberts wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. In her majority opinion, Ginsburg wrote, “We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation.” She expressly acknowledged the reasoning of Justice Kagan’s dissent, stating, “We now adopt Justice Kagan’s analysis, as has every Court of Appeals ruling on the issue post Genesis Healthcare.”
The Court noted that “The sole built-in sanction: ‘If the [ultimate] judgment . . . is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.’” [1] The Court concluded, “an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez’s complaint.”
There was an interesting little nugget at the end of Justice Ginsburg’s Rule 68 analysis. She wrote, “We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”
Stay tuned.
The Gilbert Firm provides comprehensive representation on behalf of Tennessee employees who have been harmed because of wage and hour violations. Please contact Michael Russell, Clint Scott or one of our offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson or Knoxville by calling 888.996.9731 or filling out our contact form, and scheduling your consultation with an experienced Tennessee FSLA violations attorney today.
[1] The FLSA defines “costs” and “attorneys’ fees” as separate elements. 29 U.S.C. §216(b)(“The Court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”). “Consequently, unlike attorneys’ fees in civil rights actions governed by Section 1988, which allow a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs, attorneys’ fees in an FLSA action are not automatically shifted by a Rule 68 offer.” Kearns, Kaufmann, and McClelland, The Fair Labor Standards Act, 16-239 (Bloomberg BNA, 3d ed. 2015)(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).[/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]